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This paper studies how managers at automobile assembly plants organize production across
time. Detailed data from eleven single-source automobile assembly plants display considerable
cross-plant heterogeneity. At plants which make low- and medium-selling vehicles the capital
stock often sits idle, production is more variable than sales, and weeklong shutdowns are
often used to vary output. In contrast, at plants which make high-selling vehicles, the capital
stock rarely sits idle, production is about as variable as sales, and overtime { not weeklong
shutdowns { is most frequently used to vary output. To explain this dierence in production
scheduling, I formulate and solve a dynamic programming model of a plant manager. The
solution to the dynamic program predicts that when sales are low, non-convexities at the
plant level induce the manager to bunch production at points of low average cost; thus, the
manager uses less than full capital utilization on average and makes production more volatile
than sales. When sales are high, the plant operates in a convex region of the cost curve. Hence
the manager employs high levels of capital utilization and makes production less volatile than
sales.
Department of Economics, Yale University, P.O. Box 208264, New Haven, CT 06520-8264; e-mail:
ghall@econ.yale.edu. I am grateful to the Chrysler Corporation for providing much of data used in this paper.
I have beneted from discussions with participants at numerous seminars, from comments made by an anonymous
referee, and from conversations with John Cochrane, Bill Dupor, Martin Eichenbaum, Lars Hansen, Anil Kashyap,
John Rust, Tom Sargent, Bob Schnorbus, and Lew Segal. Pier Deganello provided able research assistance. Most
of the work on this paper was done while I was on the sta at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
1 Introduction
This paper studies how managers at automobile assembly plants organize production across time.
I formulate and solve a dynamic programming model that explains the production behavior ob-
served from a new plant-level dataset. The model incorporates two non-convex margins: the
adding and dropping of an additional shift and the shutting down of the plant for a week at a
time. These non-convex margins play a central role in explaining much of the heterogeneity in
production scheduling observed in the data. Specically the model predicts that, when sales are
low, plant managers will use primarily non-convex margins to adjust output. Thus production
will be more variable than sales and the plant's capital will sit idle much of the time. In contrast,
when sales are high, plant managers will use convex margins to adjust output; this production
behavior is consistent with production as variable as sales and high levels of capital utilization.
I study a new database of fourteen automobile assembly plants. Eleven of these plants are the
sole producers of various vehicle lines. For these eleven plants, weekly data on capital utilization
and production can be accurately lined up with monthly data on employment, inventories and
sales. These data display three facts that a successful model of automobile production should
capture.
1. For the average plant the workweek of capital is just 66.8 hours. More striking though are
the dierences in capital utilization across plants. While the average workweek of capital
for some plants is close to 100 hours, it is less than 15 hours at some other plants. Yet at
all the plants the nominal premium for night work is modest, and the costs of having idle
workers on the payroll are large. Workers on the second shift receive only about 5 percent
more than workers on the rst shift. Laid-o workers from these plants receive 95 percent
of their straight time wage plus benets.
Puzzling low levels of capital utilization are not unique to the auto industry. The capital
stock in U.S. manufacturing industries is employed, on average, fewer than 60 hours per
week (Shapiro, 1995). Shapiro argues that the true marginal premium for second shift work
is closer 25 percent. Although this higher marginal shift premium partially resolves the
puzzle, the question still remains: Why does the capital stock at some of these plants sit
idle so much of the time?
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2. The average plant makes the standard deviation of monthly production 21 percent larger
than the standard deviation of sales. However, this production pattern is not uniform across
all the plants. The plants that assemble the high-selling vehicle lines make production
about as volatile as sales; the plants that assemble the low-selling vehicle lines tend to make
production much more volatile than sales.
For a wide variety of industries, production is more volatile than sales. This fact has
generated considerable attention since classic models of inventories, which assume convex
short-run increasing marginal costs, imply that rms should manage inventories such that
production is smoother than sales.1 Although many explanations have been oered, there
is no proposed answer to the question: Why is production more variable than sales at some
plants but not at others?
3. Plant managers rarely change the number of shifts or the line speed. Managers at plants
which assemble high-selling vehicles most frequently vary hours worked by using overtime.
Managers at plants that assemble low- and medium-selling vehicles regularly vary hours
worked by shutting down the plant for a week at a time. This production behavior is
puzzling since the cost of laying o workers is high.
Previous studies, such as Bresnahan and Ramey (1994), and Mattey and Strongin (1995),
have documented the frequent use of short-term layos and infrequent use of shift-changes
and line-speed changes to vary output at manufacturing plants. But this paper attempts to
explain the observed heterogeneity in production scheduling of nearly identical plants. That
is, why do some automobile assembly plants { but not others { use weeklong shutdowns so
frequently to vary output?
Building on the work of Hamermesh (1989), Ramey (1991), Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993),
and Bresnahan and Ramey (1994), this paper argues that non-convex margins of adjustment play
a key role in understanding these facts. These non-convexities arise from two sources. First,
the plant faces an integer constraint on the number of shifts that can be run. Second, there are
xed costs to opening the plant each week and running a shift. Additionally, provisions in the
union labor contract (i.e., the required premium for overtime and a pay oor for short-weeks)
create kinks in the plant's cost function. These labor contract provisions and non-convex margins
1See Blinder and Maccini (1991) and the citations therein.
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produce large discontinuous drops in the plant's marginal cost curve. When sales are low, the
plant operates in a non-convex region of its cost curve. In this region it is optimal for the plant
to oscillate between periods of not producing and periods of producing a lot. This production
behavior is consistent with a low average workweek of capital, production more variable than
sales, and frequent plant shutdowns. However when sales are high, the plant operates in a convex
region of its cost curve, so the rm wishes to smooth production and use high levels of capital
utilization.
I solve a dynamic cost minimization model of an assembly plant manager who takes the sales
process as given. Consequently, I do not need to make any restrictive assumptions about the
market structure or the nature of demand in order to solve the model. But the large automakers
do behave as if they face downward sloping demand curves for their products.2 So, this model
can be viewed as a sub-problem which a prot-maximizing automaker solves when choosing from
a menu of prices and quantities.
The formal analysis involves solving the dynamic cost minimization model for nine of the
eleven single-source plants. I use the dataset to both parameterize the model and evaluate the
performance of the model. One of the advantages of modeling production at the plant level is
that several of the parameters do not need to be estimated; they are simply drawn from the labor
contracts. Other parameters are estimated to match moments of the employment and sales data.
The results of this dynamic model demonstrate that much of the variation across plants in capital
utilization and relative variability of production and sales can be attributed to the mean of the
sales process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section provides some background
information on how automobile assembly plants are run. The third section presents the dataset.
The fourth section develops the intuition behind the model. The fth section presents the dynamic
programming model. In the sixth section parameter values are selected, the model is solved, and
moments implied by the model are compared to moments in the data. In the nal section some
concluding comments are made.
2See Bresnahan (1981), Blanchard and Melino (1986), and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) for models of the
automobile industry in which both prices and quantities are endogenous.
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2 Some auto industry details
Although there is some variation across plants and rms, most production decisions for automobile
assembly plants are made at the monthly frequency. Once a month, there is a capacity planning
meeting in which production schedules are set. At this meeting managers are presented with last
month's sales and inventory numbers and a sales forecast. The managers must then set and revise
their production schedule. They have ve margins at their disposal.
The rst margin is how many weeks the plant is scheduled to be open. The second margin is
how many days per week the plant is scheduled to be open. The third margin is the scheduled
number of shifts per day. The fourth is the scheduled length (in hours) of each shift. The fth
margin is the rate of output { in jobs (vehicles) per hour. This last margin is usually called the



















The costs associated with manipulating these ve margins dier. Many of these dierences are
due to the structure of the labor contracts these plants operate under.
Although production schedules are usually set at a monthly frequency, standard labor contracts
are written with a one-week time period in mind. The average straight-time, day-shift wage at
these plants about is $18 an hour plus benets. Workers on the second (evening) shift receive a
5 percent premium. Workers on a third (night) shift receive a 10 percent premium. Any work
in excess of eight hours in a day and all Saturday work is paid at a rate of time and an half.
Employees working fewer than 40 hours per week must be paid 85 percent of their hourly wage
times the dierence between 40 and the number of hours worked. This \short-week compensation"
is in addition to the wages the worker receives for the hours s/he actually worked.
If the rm chooses to not operate a U.S. plant for a week, the workers are laid o. After a
single waiting week each year, laid-o workers receive 95 cents on the dollar of their 40 hour pay
in unemployment compensation. Of this 95 cents, state unemployment insurance (UI) pays about
60 cents. The remaining 35 cents is picked up by supplemental unemployment benets (SUB).
Firms do not pay laid-o workers directly, but laying o workers does increase the rm's experience
rating and UI premiums in the future. Because of the cross-industry subsidies inherent in the
UI system, rms end up paying about half of the 60 cents coming from UI.3 Since the SUB is a
3See Anderson and Meyer (1993) and Aizcorbe (1990).
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negotiated benet between the rm and the union, the rm ultimately pays all 35 cents. So, after
the initial waiting week, it costs the rm about 65 percent of the 40 hour wage to lay a worker
o for one week.
Unemployment insurance in Canada is slightly dierent. For laid-o Canadian auto workers
there is a two-week waiting period each year before benets are paid. These workers then receive
95 percent of their 40 hour wage in unemployment compensation. Government unemployment
insurance pays 55 percent of a worker's full-time earnings. The remainder is picked up by SUB.
Unlike the U.S., Canadian UI is not experience rated, so the rm only pays the SUB portion.
Since 1992, several North American assembly plants have started to run three seven-hour
shifts per day. This allows the plant to be run 21 hours a day. Workers at these plants are paid
eight hours of wages per day, Monday through Friday, for their seven hours of work. Therefore
with no overtime, workers are paid a 40-hour wage for working 35 hours.
3 The data
This section describes a dataset of fourteen automobile assembly plants in the United States and
Canada. The dataset contains weekly production data from the rst week of 1990 to the last
week of 1994 and monthly employment, sales, inventory, and production data from January 1990
through December 1994. All the assembly plants are run by the Chrysler Corporation.
For each assembly plant the following weekly data were collected: 1. the number of days the
plant operated; 2. the number of days the plant was down for holidays, supply disruptions, model
changeovers, or inventory adjustments; 3. the number of shifts run; 4. the hours per shift run;
5. the scheduled jobs per day (line speed); and 6. the actual production for each vehicle line
produced at the plant. The Chrysler Corporation supplied data on 1, 3, 4, and 5. Data on 2 and
6 were taken from Ward's Automotive Reports, Ward's AutoInfoBank, and Automotive News.
For each vehicle line produced at these plants, monthly sales data were collected. Total sales
by vehicle line are the sum of sales by U.S. dealers, Canadian retail sales, and exports to the
rest of the world. Sales by U.S. dealers are from Ward's. Canadian retail sales are from the
Motor Vehicle Manufactures Association (MVMA).4 Exports are from the American Automobile
4Since Ward's and the MVMA aggregate the sales of the regular wheelbase minivans (Caravan and Voyager
assembled at the Windsor facility) with the extended wheelbase minivans (Grand Caravan and Grand Voyager
assembled at the St. Louis II facility), I use U.S. registration data provided by The Polk Company to decompose
the Caravan and Voyager sales numbers.
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Manufacturers Association (AAMA).
For eleven of the plants, Chrysler provided the number of paychecks written each month. At
these plants a pay-period is one week. So using the weekly data described above, I was able to
construct a measure of employment for each plant.
Of the fourteen plants in the sample, eleven plants are single-source plants for at least part
of the time. A single-source plant is a facility that is the exclusive producer of a set of vehicle
lines. By restricting myself to single-source plants, I am able to line up inventory and sales data
by vehicle line to employment, production, and hours worked by plant. The assembly plants in
the sample are listed in table 1. Table 1 also reports whether each plant is a single-source plant
or not, and it lists the vehicle lines produced at each plant. This database is similar to the weekly
database constructed by Bresnahan and Ramey (1994).5 In particular they identify six of the
50 plants in their sample as single-source plants; they refer to this subset as the \six matched
plants."
These data display three facts. These facts are now presented in a slightly dierent order than
in the introduction.
Fact 3 Managers rarely change the number of shifts or the line speed to vary output. Managers
at plants that assemble low-selling vehicles most frequently vary hours worked by shutting down
the plant for a week at a time. Managers at plants which assemble high-selling vehicles most
frequently vary hours worked by using overtime.
Recall from equation (1) that scheduled output is the product of ve margins. Table 2 reports
how often each of the ve margins are used at each plant. The table reports the number of weeks
each plant was open, closed, running a short-week, or running overtime. The table also reports the
number of times a shift was added or dropped and the number of line speed changes. There are
261 weeks in the sample period. The plants are divided into four groups. The single-source plants
are in the rst three groups. The dual-source plants are in the fourth group. The single-source
plants are divided up into plants which make the high-, medium-, and low-selling vehicles. Since
production of the Jeep Wrangler moved from Brampton to Toledo II in 1992, these two plants
are concatenated.
A plant is counted as open for the week if it is up and running at least one day during the
5Aizcorbe (1992), Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993), Kashyap and Wilcox (1993), and Aizcorbe and Kozicki (1995)
also study plant-level data for automobile assembly plants but at the monthly frequency.
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week. Otherwise it is counted as closed. If the plant is closed or open fewer than 5 days during the
week, the primary reason for the downtime is reported. Following Bresnahan and Ramey (1994),
every closure is classied under one of the following categories: holiday or union dictated vacation
(HOL), model changeover (MC), supply disruption (SUP), inventory adjustment (IA), or long-run
closure (LRUN). Columns 2 through 5 in table 2 report the number of full-week closures broken
down by category. Long-run closures are not reported; a plant is classied under a long-run
closure if it is closed for more than three months in a row.
Weeklong shutdowns are frequent. Consider the bottom two rows of table 2. The average plant
was only open 173 weeks out of 261 total weeks; that is only 2/3 of the weeks available. Even if
the long-run closures are excluded, the average plant was only open 84 percent of the available
weeks (173 out of a possible 207 weeks). Thus the average plant was closed about 8 1/2 weeks
each year. Weeklong shutdowns for inventory adjustment account for most of this downtime.
The averages however do not tell the whole story. Several of the plants, in particular Jeerson
North, St. Louis II, and Windsor, were rarely closed for inventory adjustment (or for any other
reason). The vehicles made at these plants (sport utility vehicles and minivans) have been among
Chrysler's best sellers. In contrast, from 90:1 to 91:12, Bramalea was closed more weeks for
inventory adjustment than it was open. During that time the slow-selling Premier and Monaco
were assembled there. This is also the case for Toledo II from 90:1 through 91:6 while the Grand
Wagoneer (a low seller) was assembled. Weeklong shutdowns most frequently occurred at plants
which made low-selling vehicles.
Table 2 also reports the total number of weeks each plant was open for fewer than ve days.
This is the number of \short-weeks." In column 7, the number of short-weeks that are due to
holidays is also reported. From these two columns, it is clear that almost all the short-weeks in
the sample are due to holidays. Many of the remaining non-holiday short-weeks are explained by
supply disruptions. Very few of these short-weeks are due to inventory adjustment. This is not
surprising given the 85 percent short-week rule in the union labor contract discussed above.6
Column 8 reports the number weeks each plant used overtime. The average plant used overtime
during 38.4 percent of the weeks in the sample. The plants which made the most extensive use
of overtime (i.e., Jeerson North, St. Louis II, and Windsor) are the plants that rarely shut
down for inventory adjustment. In contrast several of the plants that rarely used overtime, such
6See Aizcorbe (1992)and Bresnahan and Ramey (1994).
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as Bramalea(90:1-91:12), St. Louis I, and Toledo II(90:1-91:6), were frequently shut down for
inventory adjustment. The medium-sales plants such as Pillette Road and Toledo I used both
overtime and weeklong shutdowns to vary output. In general, overtime was used frequently, and
the plants which made the high-selling vehicle lines used overtime the most.
Finally, columns 9 and 10 report the number of times a shift is added or dropped and the
number of times a change in the line speed is made. Changes in the number of shifts were
made rarely. At all the plants, changes in the line speed occurred less frequently than weeklong
shutdowns or weeks with overtime.
Fact 1 The average plant operates only 66.8 hours of the 168 available hours in a week.
Table 3 reports the number of shifts run and the average workweek of capital for each plant.
The average workweek of capital conditioned on the plant not being under a long-run closure
is presented in the far right column. The average workweek of capital conditioned on the plant
being open is presented in column 4.
The three plants that were identied as frequent users of overtime and infrequent users of
inventory adjustment (Jeerson North, St. Louis II, and Windsor) are plants which employed
three shifts by the end of the sample. Not surprisingly these three \3-shift plants" have the longest
average workweeks of capital. The plants which rarely used overtime and were often closed for
inventory adjustment, Bramalea(90:1-91:12), St. Louis I, and Toledo II(90:1-91:6), all ran 1 shift
and have the shortest workweeks of capital.
Shapiro (1995) states that \the workweek of capital in U.S. manufacturing averages less than
60 hours per week." At the Chrysler plants, when the long-run closures are excluded, the average
workweek of capital is 66.8 hours.7 This is in the ballpark of Shapiro's statement. This nding
is also consistent with other measures of capital utilization reported by Shapiro. Shapiro (1993)
reports that for manufacturing plants sampled by the Census' Survey of Plant Capacity from 1977-
1988 the average workweek of capital is 80.3 hours/week. Using data from the BLS's Industry
Wage Survey, Shapiro (1995) reports that the capital stock is utilized only 11.4 hours per 24 hour
day for the industries he studies.
Shapiro (1995) nds these low levels of capital utilization puzzling. So he asks, if second shift
employees are paid only 5 percent more than their rst-shift counterparts, why do more rms
7If long-run closures are not excluded, the average workweek of capital is 53.1 hours. This is in line with Shapiro's
statement.
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not employ second shifts? He partially answers this question by providing evidence that the true
marginal premium for night work substantially exceeds the nominal premium. Shapiro argues
a better estimate of the shift premium is 25 percent. However the short average workweek of
capital reported here is not due to the plants' failure to run second shifts { all but three plants
ran more than a single shift. This short average workweek of capital is largely due to the plants
being closed so much of the time. Conditional on the plants being open, the average workweek of
capital is 80.0 hours.
The dierences in the average workweek of capital across the plants are striking. At one
extreme is Toledo II; while the Grand Wagoneer was being assembled, the Toledo II facility
averaged only 12.7 hours of use per week. At the other extreme is St. Louis II; it ran, on average,
almost 100 hours per week. If one thinks of 100 hours per week as a lower bound on what is
possible to utilize capital, then the Toledo II facility utilized its capital only 12.7 percent of the
time available. The Pillette Road facility is perhaps more representative of the sample. Pillette
Road was never down for a long-run closure during the sample period but averaged only 60.4
hours of use per week. So it utilized its capital less than two-thirds of the time available. The
question still remains: Why is the level of capital utilization so low at so many of the plants?
Fact 2 For the average plant, production is more volatile than sales. For the plants that assemble
the high-selling vehicle lines, production is about as volatile as sales. For the plants that assemble
the medium- and low-selling vehicle lines, production is more volatile than sales.
Table 4 provides the means and standard deviations of the monthly production, sales and
inventory data for the set of single-source plants. Total sales are the sum of U.S. sales, Canadian
sales, and exports to the rest of the world. Inventories are computed by a perpetual inventory
method. Inventories are benchmarked so that the inventories of discontinued vehicle lines are
eventually zero. Inventories for all other vehicles lines are benchmarked using December 1989
U.S. dealer inventory-to-sales ratios.
The three plants with the highest average levels of monthly production are Windsor, St. Louis
II, and Jeerson North; these plants rarely closed and used overtime extensively.8 More interesting
are the relative standard deviations of production and sales. For all but four plants, the standard
8I refer to these plants as the \high-sales" plants. However more vehicles were sold from the Dodge City plant
than from the Jeerson North plant. But unlike Dodge City, Jeerson North began the period with zero inventories.
So perhaps at better label would be \high sales + inventory accumulation."
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deviation of production is substantially greater than the standard deviation of sales. Note three
of the exceptions: Jeerson North, St. Louis II, and Windsor. For the plants that rarely shut
down for a week at time but use overtime extensively, production is about as volatile as sales.
For the plants which shut down for inventory adjustment more frequently, production is more
volatile than sales.9 The standard deviation of aggregate production over these eleven plants is
30 percent larger then the standard deviation of aggregate sales.
4 A static example
This section presents a simple one-period cost minimization problem of a plant manager. The
static case is presented solely for pedagogical purposes. The importance of the non-convexities in
the manager's problem are more easily illustrated in the static case than in the dynamic case.
Consider a plant in which the rate of production (the line speed) is Cobb-Douglas in capital, k,
and labor, n. The time period is one week. The plant must produce at least q goods. The plant
can operates D days. It can run one or two shifts, S, each day; both shifts are of length h. Let n
employees work each shift. Workers on the rst and second shifts are paid wage rates w1 and w2
respectively. Assume there is a xed cost to opening the plant and it takes at least n employees
per shift to produce any output.10
The plant faces a standard labor contract.11 Given this contract, the plant manager must
choose how many days to operate the plant, how many shifts to run, how many hours to run each
shift, and how many workers to employ on each shift, to minimize the total cost of producing q.
Formally, the manager wishes to:
min
D;S;h;n
(w1 + I(S = 2)w2)Dhn+max[0; 0:85(w1 + I(S = 2)w2)(40  Dh)n]
+max[0; 0:5(w1 + I(S = 2)w2)D(h  8)n] + 
9The one exception is Bramalea. When Chrysler purchased American Motors from Renault, Chrysler agreed to
build a minimum number of Premiers and Monacos (using Renault parts) at Bramalea. Weak sales of these two
vehicle lines forced Chrysler to oer deep discounts eventually. Consequently the volatility of sales for these two
vehicle lines is large.
10The production function in this model diers from the one studied by Lucas (1970), Mayshar and Halevi (1991)
and Bils (1992) in two ways. In this model, the same number of employees work each shift and the production
function is generalized to allow for overhead labor. Allowing the number of employees to vary across shifts implies
counter-factually that the line speed diers across shifts.
11I assume the wage schedule from the labor contract is allocative.
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subject to:
q  DSh(k1 (n  n))
where I(S = 2) is an indicator function. The parameter  is between 0 and 1. The rst term
in the objective function represents the straight-time wage paid to workers on both shifts. The
second term captures the 85 percent rule for short-weeks, and the third term captures the overtime
premium. The fourth term, , is a xed cost to opening the plant. This example ignores benets
and other xed payments to employees.
Note that production is linear in total hours worked but curved over employment. Without
either the 85 percent rule for short-weeks or the requirement that at least n employees work
each shift, it would always be optimal to run both shifts since the marginal product of labor
approaches innity as n   n approaches zero. However in the presence of these xed costs, the
plant can produce low levels of output cheaper with a single shift than with two shifts.
From the discussion in section 2, it is straightforward to assign values to a subset of the
parameters. The average day-shift wage at an automobile assembly plant is $18 per hour, and
evening-shift workers are paid a 5 percent premium; this implies that w1 = 18:00 and w2 = 18:90.
Bounds can be placed on some of the manager's choice variables. The time period in this example
is one week, so D can take on any integer between 0 and 7 inclusive. Most plants run either one
or two shifts; so S equals 1 or 2. Hours per shift, h, is usually set between 7 and 10.
Let k be normalized to unity and n be set to 500. I assume it takes 1,000 production workers
to run a shift with a line speed of 50 vehicles per hour, so I set  = 0:63. Set  = $100; 000. The
choice of  will be discussed in more detail below.
To illustrate the role non-convexities in the plant's cost function play in the allocation of labor,
consider the following. Set D to 5 and h to 8. The manager now has two margins along which to
vary output: the number of shifts and the number of employees (line speed). Conditional on the








in order to produce q. The cost of producing q with S shifts is then:
C(q; S) = (w1 + I(S = 2)w2)Dhn(q; S) + : (3)
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The cost curves conditional on one and two shifts, C(q; 1) and C(q; 2) respectively, are plot-
ted in gure 1. Both cost curves are upward sloping, convex, and cross each other once. The
plant manager simply chooses to run a single shift if C(q; 1) < C(q; 2) or to run two shifts if
C(q; 1) > C(q; 2). Hence the total cost curve for the plant, TC(q), is the envelop of the two cost
curves graphed in gure 1. This total cost curve is plotted in gure 2.
It is clear from gure 2 that the plant's total cost curve is non-convex. There is a kink in
TC(q) at the value of q such that C(q; 1) is equal to C(q; 2); call this value of q, q. There is also
a discontinuity between producing zero and producing . Over the subintervals (; q) and (q;1),
TC(q) is still convex. The non-convexities are caused by the xed costs associated with opening
the plant and opening a second shift.
Both C(q; 1) and C(q; 2) individually imply standard U-shaped average cost curves. However
TC(q), with its kink at q, implies a `double-U' shaped average cost curve. See gure 3. Similarly,
both C(q; 1) and C(q; 2) individually imply upward sloping marginal cost curves; but because of
the kink in TC(q) at q, the marginal cost curve is discontinuous. See gure 4.12
The hours-per-shift versus the shifts-per-day margin can studied in a similar fashion. Set D
to 5 and n to 1,500. Hence the manager can now adjust the number of shifts, S, or the hours per






in order to produce q. So the cost of producing q goods while operating a single shift is:
C(q; 1) = w1Dh(q; S)n+max[0; 0:85w1(40  Dh(q; S))n]
+max[0; 0:5w1D(h(q; S)   8)n] + :
And the cost of producing q goods while operating two shifts is:
C(q; 2) = (w1 + w2)Dh(q; S)n+max[0; 0:85(w1 + w2)(40  Dh(q; S))n]
+max[0; 0:5(w1 + w2)D(h(q; S)   8)n] + :
The cost curves conditional on one and two shifts, C(q; 1) and C(q; 2) respectively, are plotted in
gure 5. As in the previous exercise, both cost curves are upward sloping and cross each other
12The units on the y-axis dier across gures 1 to 4.
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once. So the total cost curve for the plant, TC(q), is the envelop of the two individual cost curves
and is plotted in gure 6.
In gure 6, the total cost curve is not dierentiable at four points. First, the 85 percent
short-week rule and the xed cost to opening the plant cause a discontinuity at zero. Second, the
required overtime premium causes kinks at points A and C. Finally there is kink at the point
where C(q; 1) = C(q; 2). Call this point B. Let the origin be denoted by O. As in the previous
example, kinks in the total cost curve cause discontinuities in the marginal cost curve and multiple
local minima in the average cost curve. See gures 7 and 8.
These non-convexities can be exploited to lower the plant's costs. From gure 6 - 8 one can
see for any value of  between 0 and 1,
TC(O) + (1  )TC(q(C))  TC(O + (1  )q(C)):
Thus, a plant manager who must produce q such that O < q < q(C) would ideally like to take
a linear combination of producing O and producing q(C). Following such a strategy would lower
the plant's total cost and make production more volatile than sales.13 If this is possible, the plant
manager would never produce in the region 0 < q < q(C). The manager's incentive to exploit
Jensen's inequality motivates the need to model the manager's problem as a dynamic problem
and introduce inventories.
If the manager must produce q such that q > q(C), then the plant operates on a convex portion
of the cost curve. Indeed the marginal cost curve is at in this region (holding employment xed).
See gure 8. In such a region there is no incentive to make production more volatile than sales.
From this intuition, it is not surprising that the assembly plants which produced the most vehicles
per month (Jeerson North, St. Louis II, and Windsor) use overtime extensively and rarely shut
down for inventory adjustment. They are also the plants for which the standard deviation of
production is about equal to the standard deviation of sales. See table 4.
From looking at gure 6 it is not obvious that the line segment OC convexies TC(q). It is
not clear that the point A is above the line segment OC. So when is TC(q) convexied by the
single line segment OC? And when is TC(q) convexied by the two line segments OA and AB?
This is equivalent to asking: under what conditions is slope of OC less than the slope of OA?
13An analogous argument can be made for the previous example.
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The answer is when:
(w2   w1) D  h  n < : (5)
Plugging in reasonable numbers yields:
($18:90   $18:00)  5  8  1000 < 
$36; 000 < :
So this simple static model does imply some restrictions on the data. Consider a simple multi-
period problem with no costs of holding inventories. Suppose a plant must produce four shifts
worth of output in three weeks. The manager will choose to operate two shifts for two weeks and
close down for the third week if  > $36; 000. If  < $36; 000, the plant will run two shifts one
week and a single shift for two weeks. One can see from table 2 that shift changes rarely occur,
but plants are often completely shutdown for a week at a time. This suggests that the xed cost
to opening the plant, , is large.
5 The dynamic model
The above discussion appeals to the plant manager's ability to exploit Jensen's inequality without
formally discussing a multiperiod model. This section formulates a dynamic programming model
of an automobile assembly plant. As in the static example, the manager in the dynamic model
controls the plant's labor allocation (and thus production) to minimize the expected discounted
cost of production subject to technological constraints and the nonlinear price schedule for labor.
5.1 The dynamic program
Consider a plant which produces qt output at time t. As in the static model, the plant manager
has four margins along which to adjust output each period: the number of days the plants is
open, the number of shifts run, the length of each shift, and rate of output per unit of time. Let
Dt denote the number of days the plant is open. Let St denote the number of shifts that are run.
Let ht denote the number of hours each shift runs. Finally let nt denote the number of employees
who work each shift.
Line speed is Cobb-Douglas in capital and the number of employees at work in excess of n2.
Thus n2 is the number of overhead workers it takes to run a shift. Let kt be the time t capital
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stock. So output produced during period t is:
qt = DtStht[k
1 
t (nt   n2)
] (6)
where 0    1.
The total number of workers the plant has on its payroll at time t is Xtnt+ n1. Let n1 denote
the number of non-production workers (e.g. engineers, administrative personnel) at the plant.
Non-production workers are paid a xed wage each period and are never laid o. Let Xt denotes
the number of shifts of production workers the plant has hired. So Xtnt are the total number
of production workers hired. Individual production workers can only work one shift. Production
workers on the payroll who do not work either shift receive unemployment compensation. This
unemployment compensation is charged directly and immediately to the rm.
I impose the following restriction:
Stnt + n1  Xtnt + n1: (7)
In words, the total number of employees working must be less than or equal to the number of
employees on the payroll. Each period the manager chooses the number of workers to have on
the payroll next period. There is a xed cost to changing Xt+1nt+1. This xed cost is set large
enough so that once a line speed is chosen, the manager will never wish to change it. This xed
cost also ensures that the rm pays unemployment compensation to employees who do not work
either shift.
The plant faces sales each period of st. Assume st takes on one of three discrete values and
evolves according to a rst-order Markov chain,
(s; s0) = Probfst+1 = s
0; st = sg for s; s
0S = fshigh; smedium; slowg:
Unsold output can be inventoried without depreciation. Let it+1 be the stock of nished goods
inventoried at the end of period t carried over into period t+ 1. Feasibility then requires that:
qt + it  st + it+1: (8)
Inventories cannot be negative:
it+1  0: (9)
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Assuming the plant's labor contract is of the form described in section 2, the plant's time t cost
function is:
C(t) = (I(St  1)w1 + I(St  2)w2 + I(St = 3)w3)Dthtnt
+max[0; 0:85(I(St  1)w1 + I(St  2)w2 + I(St = 3))(40  Dtht)nt]
+max[0; 0:5(I(St  1)w1 + I(St  2)w2 + I(St = 3))Dt(ht   8)nt] (10)
+uw140(Xt   St)nt + I(Xtnt 6= Xt+1nt+1) + I(Dt > 0) + 40w1n1;
where w1, w2, and w3 are the hourly wage rates paid to the rst-shift, second-shift and third-shift
workers, respectively. I let u denote the fraction of the 40-hour day-shift wage charged to the rm
per idle employee. So the rst term represents the straight time wages paid to the production
workers. The second and third terms capture the 85 percent rule for short-weeks and the required
overtime premium, respectively. The fourth term is the unemployment compensation bill charged
to the rm. The fth term is a xed cost of adjusting the line speed and the size of the payroll.
The sixth term denotes the xed cost to opening the plant. The last term (seventh) are the wages
paid to the plant's non-productive workers. This last term is a constant and has no eect on the
manager's allocation of labor. Recall that I() are indicator functions. To simplify the notation,
assume Dt = 0 if and only if St = 0.
The plant manager's problem is to minimize the present value of the discounted stream
of costs given a constant real risk free interest rate, r. Assume the stock of capital, kt, is
xed at k for all t. The manager's problem is then to choose a set of stochastic processes










subject to (6) - (9) and given fX0; i0; n0g.
This minimization problem is split into an intra-period problem and an inter-period problem.
The intra-period problem is as follows. For each realization of fXt; it; nt; st;Xt+1; it+1; nt+1g the
rm chooses the feasible set, fDt; St; htg, that minimizes (10). Let:
C(Xt; it; nt; st;Xt+1; it+1; nt+1) = min
Dt;St;ht
C(t) subject to (6), (7) and (8):
The inter-period problem is then solved by dynamic programming. Let V (X; i; n; s) be the optimal
value function for the plant that has X shifts of n employees on the payroll, carries inventories i
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into the period, and faces sales s. Thus, the plant's Bellman equation can be written:
V (X; i; n; s) = min
X0;i0;n0
(





(s; s0)V (X 0; i0; n0; s0)
)
(12)
subject to (9). The solution to this Bellman equation yields time invariant decision rules.
5.2 Parameter values
The time period in the dynamic model is one week. The interest rate r is set such that (1 + r) 1
equals 0.999; this corresponds to a 5 percent annual rate. I set the capital stock, k, to 1.0.
I estimated the parameters, , n1, and n2 with non-linear least squares using the data on
line speed and employment for each plant. The line speed data is weekly and the employment
data is the average number of paychecks written each month. After talking with Chrysler, I
made the following assumptions: during weeks when the plant is open and during holiday weeks,
Sitnit+n1i workers are paid; during inventory adjustment weeks, supply disruption weeks and long
term closure weeks, n1i employees are paid; during model changeover weeks, n1i + n3i employees
are paid. So n3i represents the number of employees, above and beyond n1i it takes to perform a




[(OPit +HLit)(Sitnit + n1i) + (IAit + SDit + LTit)n1i + (MCit)(n1i + n3i)]
where
Eit = average number of paychecks written during month t at plant i;
Sit = number of shifts plant i ran during month t;
WKt = number of weeks (pay-periods) during month t;
OPit = number of open weeks during month t at plant i;
HLit = number of holiday weeks during month t at plant i;
IAit = number of inventory adjustment weeks during month t at plant i;
SDit = number of supply disruption weeks during month t at plant i;
LTit = number of long-term closure weeks during month t at plant i:
Using equation (6) to eliminate nit yields:
















where LSit is the average line-speed for the month at plant i. I estimated n1i, n2i, n3i, and i,
using equation (13) for all but four of the plants. The point estimates are presented in table 5;
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Four of the plants in the sample underwent some form of major investment during the time
period I studied: Belvidere, Bramalea, and Sterling Heights switched vehicle lines; and Dodge
City was down for nine weeks in 1993 for a major re-tooling. See table 1. For these four plants,
I allowed n1i to vary across the two sub-periods. Specically, I estimated














where DUMit is equal to zero during the rst sub-period, and is equal to one during the rst
sub-period. The results are also presented in table 5.
The employment data was incomplete. I did not have employment data for the Toledo plants.
For six of the plants, seven months of employment data during 1990 are missing. Furthermore the
sample period is short. So some caution is in order when interpreting any single point estimate.
Nevertheless, most of the point estimates seem reasonable.
For all but two of the plants, the point estimates of the curvature parameter, , are between
0.5 and 1.0. And most of the point estimates of  are within two standard errors of 0.64, the
usual estimate of labor's share. On average, the point estimates of n1 and n4 imply that about
one-third of the workers at these plants are non-production workers. The point estimates of n2
imply that at the average plant about one-half of the production workers on a shift are overhead
workers. Of course there is considerable variation in the parameter estimates across the plants.
I estimated the sales processes for each of the single-source plants by assuming that weekly
sales follow an AR(1). I estimated the AR(1) parameters by maximum likelihood. Since the sales
data are monthly, I assumed weekly sales were a latent variable and used the Kalman lter to
construct the likelihood function. For each plant, I used Tauchen's (1986) method to compute
weekly three-state Markov chains whose sample paths approximate those of the estimated AR(1)
processes. For each Markov chain, the grid width was chosen to match the standard deviation
of actual sales process. The grid points were then rounded to make them compatible with the
inventory grid. To conserve on space, the estimated Markov chains are not reported but are
available from the author.
Following the discussion in the second section, wage rates are set as: w1 = $18.00 per hour,
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w2 = $18.90 per hour. The per idle employee fee for unemployment compensation, u, is set to 0.65
for the U.S. plants. For the Canadian plants, I set u = 0:40.
The parameter  is set to large enough so that changes in employment per shift (line speed)
and changes in the number of shifts hired are rarely made; but  is set small enough so that the
terminal level of employment does not eect the decision rules. I allow  to vary across the plants
between $1.0 million and $3.0 million.
There is one remaining free parameter, , the xed cost of opening the plant for the week. As
discussed in section 4, the xed cost to opening a two-shift plant each week must be large. If the
rm is operating in the non-convex region of its cost curve and the xed cost is small, then the
model will predict that the manager will open and close the second shift rather than open and
close the entire plant. So I set  to $1.0 million.
But what is this xed cost, ? There are some xed costs to opening the plant: warming up
the equipment, and heating the shop oor. Discussions from industry sources indicate that it is
considerably easier to control many of these costs, particularly energy costs, by shutting down
for a week at a time rather than sending a single shift home. Additionally, managers usually
encourage salaried workers to take vacation when the plant is shutdown. Thus the rm can avoid
having key workers on vacation when the plant is running.
But there may be other factors besides the xed costs that inuence the manager's decision
whether to shut down the plant or just lay o a single shift. The union contract dictates a strict
hierarchy concerning who gets laid o before whom. By laying the entire work force o, the rm
treats all the workers equally { thus saving the rm the cost of guring out who to lay o and
who to not.14 More generally, if the workers face diminishing marginal utility in leisure, then the
workers and the rm may prefer a complete one-week shutdown over the rm sending the second
shift home for two weeks. While these other factors are credible, the model assumes workers are
homogeneous and is silent on worker preferences.
Using the parameter values selected above, the intra-period problem is solved via grid search.
The grids for Dt and St are set from 0 to 6 and from 0 to 3, respectively, in increments of 1. The
plant is closed for the week whenever St = 0 or Dt = 0. Recall, St = 0 if and only if Dt = 0. The
shift length, ht, can take on values of 7, 8 or 9. So there are 84 grid points to evaluate for each
fXt; it; nt; st;Xt+1; it+1; nt+1g sept-tuple.
14See Aizcorbe's (1990) discussion of the UAW contract with Ford Motor Company.
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To make the inter-period problem a nite state, discounted dynamic program, the state space
is discretized. The number of shifts of workers on the payroll, Xt, can take on values of 1, 2, or
3. For each plant, there are 26 levels of shift employment. The employment grid for each plant is
set so that the line speed can vary between 0 and 100 vehicles per hour. In order to conserve on
grid points, the inventory grid is also allowed to vary across plants. For each plant, inventories
can take on 31 points from 0 to 2  shigh. The inter-period problem is solved by iterating on
the Bellman equation, (12). Once the Bellman equation is solved, the transition matrix and the
invariant probability distribution for the state space are computed. The state space is checked to
be ergodic. Using the invariant probability distribution and the decision rules, a wide variety of
population moments can be computed.
5.3 Results for nine plants
In this subsection, I use the production and sales parameters estimated above to solve the model
plant-by-plant. A set of the model's predictions for each plant is reported in table 6. The
corresponding moments in the data are also reported.
The rst column of table 6 reports the model's prediction for the ratio of the monthly standard
deviation of production to the monthly standard deviation of sales.15 The second and third
columns report the model's predictions for the average workweek of capital conditional on the
plant being open and unconditionally. The predicted number of shifts run and line speed are
reported in columns 4 and 5, respectively. Columns 6 and 7 report the unconditional probabilities
that the plant is closed for an inventory adjustment or the plant is running overtime.
For four plants (Jeerson North, St. Louis II, Windsor, and Brampton), the solution to
the dynamic programming problem implies implausibly high line speeds (over 80 vehicles/hour).
Therefore at these plants I constrained the feasible line speeds to be less than or equal to the
plant's average line speed. For each of these four plants, the constrained solution implies running
the line at the fastest feasible speed. For the remaining ve plants, the predicted line speeds are
in the interior of the feasible set.
Given the estimated parameter values, the model replicates the three fact described above.
The model predicts that at the high-sales plants, production is less variable than sales, the average
workweek of capital is over 85 hours, and overtime is frequently employed. For the medium- and
15In the model, a month is 13/3 weeks.
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low-sales plants, the model predicts that production is more variable than sales, the plants use
lower levels of capital utilization, and weeklong shutdown are frequent. The model also correctly
predicts the number of shifts used at each plant.
Of course the dynamic model is too simple to match all the features of the data.
1. At all but two of the plants, the model under-predicts the standard deviation of monthly
production. In the data, weeklong shutdowns tend to be bunched together; the average
duration of any type of weeklong closure (except supply disruptions) is greater than one
week. In the model, the duration of a shutdown at most plants is one week. Since I
aggregate each plant's output to the monthly frequency, the eect of these single-week
shutdowns tends to wash out. The duration of the shutdowns is longer in the data, so their
inuence is not dampened as much by time aggregation.
Adding a desired inventory-to-sales ratio target to the plant's cost function (equation 10)
can increase the implied duration of the weeklong shutdowns at these plants; this in turn
implies an increase in the standard deviation of monthly production. Furthermore adding
an inventory-to-sales ratio target to the model can generate the inventory accumulation
observed in the data when sales increase. The work of Blanchard (1983) and Kashyap and
Wilcox (1993), as well as the auto industry's great interest in days-supply inventory data,
suggest that automakers target such a ratio. Equation (10) does not include such a target
to isolate the eect the non-convex margins play in production scheduling.
2. With exception of Belvidere, the model over-predicts the use of overtime at the low- and
medium-sales plants. It may be that the non-linear price schedule for labor is not allocative;
there may be additional constraints on the plant manager that limit the hours of overtime
employees can work. Or it could be that production is not linear in hours; for example, as
the shift length increases, mistakes may increase as workers tire.
3. At ve of the plants (Jeerson North, St. Louis II, Windsor, Brampton, and Bramalea),
the model dramatically over-predicts the line speed. This suggests that equation (6) may
be a poor approximation to the true production technology; given the estimated parameters
there is too little curvature in employment to rationalize the observed line speed at these
ve plants.
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4. In the model, the only reason the plant ever shortens the workweek is to reduce inventories.
This assumption causes the model to ignore other states identied in the data for which
the plant might be shut down for all or part of the week. Thus the model is silent about
holidays, model changeovers, and supply disruptions.
These limitations suggest some natural extensions to the analysis.
Nevertheless the analysis illustrates that much of the heterogeneity in the production behavior
across the nine plants can be explained by a simple dynamic programming model. Of course,
since I allow several of the parameters to vary across the plants, it is not clear how much of this
cross-plant variation is due to dierence in the parameter estimates and how much is due to the
dierences in the mean of the sales processes. So in this following subsection, I resolve the model
holding xed all the parameters and varying just the sales rate.
5.4 Results assuming a deterministic sales process
In this subsection, the sales process is deterministic; the transition matrix, , is the scalar 1. I
set , n1, and n2 to the point estimates for the Belvidere plant. I set  to $1.0 million, and u to
0.65. The weekly sales rate varies from 200 to 7000 in increments of 200. The employment and
inventory grids are xed throughout this exercise.
I solve the dynamic model at each sales rate. For each sales rate, I compute the average
workweek of capital, the standard deviation of monthly production, and the total cost of pro-
duction. The total cost for a given sales rate, TC(s), is the sum of the value function at each
state, V (X; i; njs), weighted by the unconditional probability of each state, (X; i; njs). I multiply
TC(s) by (1   ) to make the units compatible with the static example. I trace out a \long-run





X;i;n (X; i; njs + 200)V (X; i; njs+ 200)   (1  )
P
X;i;n (X; i; njs)V (X; i; njs)
200
where MClr(s) denotes the long-run marginal cost at sales rate, s.
To compute a \short-run" cost curve, I x the line speed, n, and number of shifts hired, X, at
their optimal levels for a sales rate of 3600 vehicles per week (the average rate at Belvidere). Thus
the plant manager can only manipulate \short-run" margins: it, Dt, St, and ht. Bresnahan and
Ramey (1994) provide evidence that line speed and shift changes are associated with permanent
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changes in output while changes in the shift length and week-long shutdowns are associated with
temporary changes in output.16 I then repeat the above exercise.17
Consider the long-run analysis displayed in gures 9 - 12. Figure 9 illustrates that the plant's
cost total curve has both a concave and a convex region. Consequently the marginal cost curve,
plotted in gure 10, is U-shaped: it is downward sloping when sales are less than 3200 vehicles
per week; it is essentially at in the region, 3200 < sales rate < 4400; and it becomes upward
sloping when sales are greater than 4400 vehicles per week. Thus the Belvidere plant operates in
a region of increasing long-run marginal costs only when sales are high.
The concave region in the total cost curve occurs even though the manager has the ability
to manipulate inventories to exploit some of the non-convexities in the cost minimization prob-
lem. Two factors imply this concavity. First the production function, equation (6), does not
exhibit constant returns-to-scale; it takes at least n2 overhead workers to run a shift. Second
the unemployment insurance provision and the 85% short-week rule make it relatively expensive
for the plant to operate at low levels. The marginal savings of laying o a worker for one week
is just 40(1   u)w1; the marginal savings of reducing a worker's workweek by one hour is just
(1  :85)w1. The combination of the minimum number of workers needed to produce and the high
costs associated with idling these workers imply a downward sloping marginal cost curve at low
levels of output. It is reassuring that the Belvidere plant sold on average about 3600 vehicles a
week, the nadir of the long-run marginal cost curve.18
The model predicts that at low- and medium-sales levels, the plant manager primarily changes
the frequency of weeklong shutdowns, a non-convex margin, to vary output. If the sales rate is
below 5200, the optimal strategy is for the plant to produce for several weeks and build up an
inventory stock equal to one week of sales; the plant then shuts down for a week and inventories
fall to zero. Consequently, the plant manager chooses to make production volatile { despite the
fact that the sales rate is constant. See gure 12. Furthermore the optimal strategy implies
that capital often sits idle for a week at a time; note that in gure 11 the dierence between the
16Even though the changes in the sales rate are permanent, I refer to the computed cost curves as \short-run"
cost curves since I x the \long-run" margins.
17It would be interesting to study the simultaneous movements of price and marginal cost as functions of the
sales rate. Thus one could study the relative size and cyclical movements of mark-ups. However, I was unable to
obtain transaction price data for any of the vehicles produced at these plants.
18Chrysler executives told me that when sales fall, they rst adjust the price of vehicle (e.g. rebates, dealer-
incentives) to try to increase sales; if demand is not suciently elastic, they then adjust output. Such a strategy is
consistent with a U-shaped marginal cost curve.
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unconditional average workweek on capital and the workweek of capital conditional on the plant
being open (the vertical dierence between the dotted and solid lines) is quite large.
The dynamic model also captures the fact that when sales are high the plant manager primarily
manipulates the shift length, a convex margin, to vary output. When sales are greater than 5200
vehicles per week, the plant is never closed for a week at a time; as gure 11 shows, the conditional
and unconditional average workweeks of capital are equal (and over 80 hours) when sales are high.
Overtime is used extensively. Moreover the implied time series on production is relatively smooth;
gure 12 illustrates that the standard deviation of monthly production falls when the sales rate
rises above 5200.
When I x the two long-run margins, the total cost curve becomes piece-wise linear.19 See
gure 13.20 When sales are below 4600, the plant manager changes hours worked (and thus
output) by changing the number of weeks the plant operates. When sales are above 4600 the
plant manager changes hours worked by changing the shift length. Hence the marginal cost
curve, plotted in gure 14, is not U-shaped; it is at with one discontinuous jump. The average
workweek of capital becomes just a linear function of sales (gure 15). Figure 16 illustrates that
the standard deviation of monthly production falls when the plant varies output using overtime
rather than weeklong shutdowns.
A simple dynamic programming model with credible non-convex margins of adjustment can
capture much of the heterogeneity in the production behavior observed across a set of automobile
assembly plants. The model attributes the dierences across plants in capital utilization and
relative volatility of production and sales to dierences in the level of sales. High sales imply that
the plant is operating in a convex region of the cost curve, while low and medium sales imply that
the plant is operating in a non-convex region of the cost curve.
The model captures the fact that plants with low and medium sales often use weeklong shut-
downs, a non-convex margin, to vary output. Thus the model can explain why production at
these plants is more volatile than sales and why capital at these plants is often idle. At the
same time, the dynamic model captures the fact that plants which produce high-selling vehicle
lines primarily use convex margins of adjustment such as overtime employment to vary output;
therefore the model can explain why production at high-sales plants varies by about as much as
19Recall the production function, equation (6), is linear in hours worked.
20Given the xed line speed, the plant can produce at most 6000 vehicles in one week.
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sales and why capital at these plants rarely sits idle. Thus, the model succeeds in reconciling the
three facts documented in the third section.
6 Concluding remarks
The paper focuses on understanding the high-frequency production behavior of a small set of
automobile assembly plants. Thus this paper trades generality for precise data. But the non-
convexities identied in this paper are not unique to automobile assembly plants. Managers at
most manufacturing plants that produce-to-stock face these same non-convex margins: how many
shifts to run and whether to open or close the plant each week. Thus the results of this paper
may apply to other industries.21
It is unclear whether the important role non-convexities play at the plant level do not just
wash out at the aggregate level. However there is evidence that production decisions are not
independent across plants and rms. Automobile assembly plants are just one component of a
large network of suppliers and dealers. The work of Beaulieu and Miron (1991) and Cooper and
Haltiwanger (1992) provide evidence that in the presence of strategic complementarities, multiple
rms synchronize output. These papers suggest that the dramatic high frequency variations in
output observed at the plant level may not be completely smoothed out by modest aggregation.
References
[1] Aizcorbe, Ana (1990) \Experience Rating, Layos and Unions: A Look at U.S. Auto Assem-
bly Plant Layos," manuscript, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
[2] Aizcorbe, Ana (1992) \Procyclical Labour Productivity, Increasing Returns to Labour and
Labour Hoarding in Car Assembly Plant Employment," Economic Journal, Vol. 102, (July),
pp. 860-873.
[3] Aizcorbe, Ana, and Sharon Kozicki (1995) \The Comovement of Output and Labor Pro-
ductivity in Aggregate Data for Auto Assembly Plants," working paper 95-33, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
21However the work of Cecchetti, Kashyap, and Wilcox (1994) suggests that the transportation sector may not
be representative of all manufacturing.
25
[4] Anderson, Patricia, and Bruce Meyer (1993) \Unemployment Insurance in the United States:
Layo Incentives and Cross-Subsidies," Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 11 (January), pp.
S70-S95.
[5] Beaulieu, J. Joseph, and Jerey Miron (1991) \The Seasonal Cycle in U.S. Manufacturing,"
Economic Letters, Vol. 37, pp. 115-118.
[6] Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, and Ariel Pakes (1995) \Automobile Prices in Market Equi-
librium," Econometrica, Vol. 63, (July), pp. 841-890.
[7] Bils, Mark (1992) \Measuring Returns to Scale From Shift Practices in Manufacturing,"
manuscript, University of Chicago.
[8] Blanchard, Olivier (1983) \The Production and Inventory Behavior of the American Auto-
mobile Industry," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, (June), pp. 365-400.
[9] Blanchard, Olivier, and Angelo Melino (1986) \The Cyclical Behavior of Prices and Quanti-
ties: The Case of the Automobile Market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 17, (May),
pp. 379-407.
[10] Blinder, Alan, and Louis Maccini (1991) \Taking Stock: A Critical Assessment of Recent
Research on Inventories," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, (Winter), pp.73-96.
[11] Bresnahan, Timothy (1981) \Departures from Marginal-Cost Pricing in the American Auto-
mobile Industry: Estimates for 1977-78," Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 17, (November), pp.
201-227.
[12] Bresnahan, Timothy, and Valerie Ramey (1994) \Output Fluctuations at the Plant
Level,"Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, (August), pp. 593-624.
[13] Cecchetti, Stephen, Anil Kashyap, and David Wilcox (1994) \Do Firms Smooth the Seasonal
in Production in a Boom? Theory and Evidence," manuscript, University of Chicago.
[14] Cooper, Russell, and John Haltiwanger (1992) \Macroeconomic Implications of Production
Bunching: Factor Demand Linkages," Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 30, (October),
pp. 107-127.
26
[15] Cooper, Russell, and John Haltiwanger (1993) \The Aggregate Implications of Machine Re-
placement: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, Vol. 83, (June), pp. 360-382.
[16] Hamermesh, Daniel (1989) \Labor Demand and the Structure of Adjustment Costs," Amer-
ican Economic Review, Vol. 79, (September), pp. 674-689.
[17] Kashyap, Anil, and David Wilcox (1993) \Production and Inventory Control at the General
Motors Corporation During the 1920's and 1930's," American Economic Review, Vol. 83,
(June), pp. 383-401.
[18] Lucas, Robert (1970) \Capacity, Overtime, and Empirical Production Functions," American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 60, (May), pp. 23-27.
[19] Mattey, Joe and Steve Strongin (1995) \Factor Utilization and Margins for Adjusting Out-
put: Evidence from Manufacturing Plants," working paper 95-12, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
[20] Mayshar, Joram, and Yoram Halevi (1992) \On the Time Pattern of Production: Shiftwork,
Hours of Work, and Factor Employment," manuscript, Hebrew University.
[21] Ramey, Valerie (1991) \Nonconvex Costs and the Behavior of Inventories," Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, Vol. 99, (April), pp. 306-334.
[22] Shapiro, Matthew (1993) \Cyclical Productivity and the Workweek of Capital," American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 83, (May), pp. 229-233.
[23] Shapiro, Matthew (1995) \Capital Utilization and the Marginal Premium for Work at Night,"
manuscript, University of Michigan.
[24] Tauchen, George (1986) \Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to Univariate and Vec-
tor Autoregressions," Economic Letters, Vol. 20, pp. 177-181.
27
Plant Period U.S. or Single Vehicle Lines
(YR:M) Canada Source?
Belvidere 90:1 - 93:5 U.S. yes New Yorker Salon, Dynasty, Fifth Ave., Imperial
93:11 - 94:12 no Neon
Bramalea 90:1 - 91:12 Canada yes Monaco, Premier
92:6 - 94:12 no Concorde, LHS, Vision, Intrepid
Brampton 90:1 - 92:4 Canada yes Wrangler
Dodge City 90:1 - 93:5 U.S. yes Ram Pickup, Dakota
93:7 - 94:12 no Ram Pickup, Dakota
Jeerson North 92:1 - 94:12 U.S. yes Grand Cherokee
Newark 90:1 - 94:12 U.S. no Acclaim, Spirit, Intrepid, LeBaron Sedan
Pillette Road 90:1 - 94:12 Canada yes Ram Van, Ram Wagon
St. Louis I 90:1 - 91:5 U.S. yes Daytona, LeBaron Coupe
St. Louis II 90:1 - 94:12 U.S. yes Grand Caravan, Grand Voyager, Town & Country
Sterling Heights 90:1 - 94:3 U.S. no Daytona, Shadow, Sundance
94:8 - 94:12 no Cirrus
Toledo I 90:1 - 94:12 U.S. yes Cherokee, Commanche, Wagoneer
Toledo II 90:1 - 91:6 U.S. yes Grand Wagoneer
92:7 - 94:12 yes Wrangler
Toledo III 93:9 - 94:12 U.S. no Dakota
Windsor 90:1 - 94:12 Canada yesy Caravan, Voyager
Table 1: Assembly Plants and Their Vehicle Lines
y The Eurostar plant in Austria produced a version of the Voyager beginning in the fourth quarter of 1991 solely





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Plant Period # Shifts Conditional Conditional
(YR:M) Run On Open On Not LRUN
Jeerson North 92:1-94:12 1,2,3 89.5 85.1
St. Louis II 90:1-94:12 2,3 104.4 99.2
Windsor 90:1-94:12 2,3 94.4 87.9
Belvidere 90:1-93:5 1,2 73.7 58.7
Brampton/Toledo II 90:1-94:12 1,2 59.5 52.3
Dodge City 90:1-93:5 2 81.6 71.0
Pillette Road 90:1-94:12 2 78.0 60.4
Toledo I 90:1-94:12 2 80.7 67.1
Bramalea 90:1-91:12 1 36.3 14.0
St. Louis I 90:1-91:5 1 38.2 27.7
Toledo II 90:1-91:6 1 33.8 12.7
Belvidere 93:11-94:12 1,2 80.4 75.0
Bramalea 92:6-94:12 2 80.3 76.0
Dodge City 93:7-94:12 1,2 92.5 88.9
Newark 90:1-94:12 2 83.2 70.2
Sterling Heights 90:1-94:12 1,2 80.4 64.9
Toledo III 93:9-94:12 1 43.3 40.7
average plant 74.5 63.1
Weighted average 80.0 66.8






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Cost conditional on running
one shift, C(q; 1), and running two shifts,
C(q; 2) holding hours per shift xed.

















Figure 2: Total cost allowing either one
or two shifts to run, TC(q), holding hours
per shift xed.


















Figure 3: Average cost curve allowing ei-
ther one or two shifts to run, holding hours
per shift xed.





















Figure 4: Marginal cost curve allowing ei-
ther one or two shifts to run, holding hours
per shift xed.
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Figure 5: Cost conditional on running
one shift, C(q; 1), and running two shifts,













Figure 6: Total cost curve allowing either




















Figure 7: Average cost curve allowing ei-



















Figure 8: Marginal cost curve allowing ei-
ther one or two shifts to run, holding em-
ployment xed
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Plant time no. of  n1 n2 n3 n4 R
2
period usable obs.
Belvidere 90:1-94:12 53 0.628 567 532 268 316 0.76
(0.020) (159) (154) (369) (123)
Bramalea 90:1-94:12 60 0.707 196 670 20 599 0.93
(0.039) (51) (113) (199) (71)
Brampton 90:1-92:4 27 1.0y 563 201 184 0.48
(79) (44) (203)
Dodge City 90:1-94:12 53 0.616 1123 158 0z 1096 0.41
(0.029) (228) (247) (191)
Jeerson North 92:1-93:5 49 0.620 364 658 1588 0.97
(0.017) (54) (98) (348)
Newark 90:1-94:12 53 0.702 1405 596 268 0.47
(0.062) (309) (191) (420)
Pillette Road 90:1-94:12 60 0.522 703 80 254 0.67
(0.018) (140) (137) (170)
St. Louis I 90:1-91:5 10 0.767 894 409 0z 0.33
(0.590) (301) (781)
St. Louis II 90:1-94:12 53 0.915 970 1005 2067 0.76
(0.358) (231) (145) (624)
Sterling Heights 90:1-94:12 53 1.0y 708 772 253 283 0.53
(195) (113) (563) (195)
Windsor 90:1-94:12 60 0.663 465 1121 1664 0.90
(0.020) (187) (96) (288)
Table 5: Parameter values for the production function
y To avoid estimates of i greater than 1.0 for Brampton and Sterling Heights, I xed i to be 1.0 prior to estimation.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9: The long-run total cost curve.






















Figure 10: The long-run marginal cost
curve.























Figure 11: Unconditional average work-
week of capital (solid line) and the aver-
age workweek of capital conditional of the
plant being open (dotted line).















Figure 12: Standard deviation of monthly
output as a function of the weekly sales
rate.
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Figure 13: The short-run total cost curve.




















Figure 14: The short-run marginal cost
curve.























Figure 15: Unconditional average work-
week of capital (solid line) and the aver-
age workweek of capital conditional of the
plant open (dotted line).















Figure 16: Standard deviation of monthly
output as a function of the weekly sales
rate.
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